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Skill differentials in wages declined in the 1970's and rose in the
1980's, but aggregate wage inequality grew throughout the period.
This divergence remains a puzzle in recent studies of U.S. wage in-
equality. In this paper the sometimes divergent paths of intergroup
and intra-group inequality are explained by the human capital ap-
proach. In it, wages are the return on cumulated human capital
investments. The inter-personal distributions of investments and of
marginal rates of return on them are determined by individual supply
and demand curves. Recent studies have shown that relative growth
of human capital supply in the 1970's and of demand in the 1980's
generated the U-shaped time pattern of ("between group") skill dif-
ferentials. Argument and evidence in this paper show that a widening
of dispersion among individual demand curves started in the 1970's
and generated a continuous expansion of ("within group") residual
wage inequality. The widening dispersion in demand curves reflects a
growing skill bias in the demand for labor. Aggregate inequality grew
throughout the period because within group inequality accounts for
the larger part of total inequality.
1 Introduction
The past quarter century witnessed major changes in the U.S. wage distri-
bution. Skill differentials in wages due to differences in education declined in
the 70's but rose sharply in the 80's (Fig 1) while differentials due to work
experience rose in the 70's and remained large in the 80's. Wage differentials
within education and experience groups rose throughout the 70's and 80's.
The rapidly growing skill wage gap in the 80's and the increase in overall
wage inequality since the 70's (Fig 2) stimulated a number of studies1. At
first most of the studies focused on the wage structure ("between group"
differentials), defined by education and working age. Subsequently a number
of studies attempted to explain within group differentials, the larger part of
total inequality2.
A consensus appears to be emerging on the interpretation of changes in
skill differentials in wages. These are seen as outcomes of shifts in the supply
and demand for human capital with supply increases dominating in the 70's
and technology driven demand growth dominating in the 80's3. However no
clear picture emerges from the variety of hypotheses to which within group
changes in wage differentials have been subjected4. The intuitive notion
that within group differentials correspond to unmeasured skill differentials
and so should move together with the educational wage differentials faces
the divergent patterns of change between and within groups for part of the
period5.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a human capital analysis of both
intergroup and intra-group wage inequality, measured by variances in log-
wages, and their changes over time. The approach reveals that, in principle,
within group inequality is not directly or closely related to between group
variances, so that differential movements in the two components of inequality
are possible. Understanding the course of within group inequality requires
xThe detailed facts and findings reported in studies available up to 1992 are described
comprehensively in the survey of Levy and Murnane (1992). Additional studies prior to
1995 are described by Kosters (1994) and Kodrzycki (1995).
2In an analysis of variance or regression sense.
3See e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992), and Mincer (1993).
4Levy and Murnane (1992); Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993).
5Levy and Murnane view this contradiction as a major puzzle in current research on
the wage distribution. According to Kodrzycki the puzzle remained unresolved in 1995.
a disaggregation of group demand and supply curves of human capital to
the individual level along the lines suggested by Becker (1967). It then be-
comes apparent that a widening dispersion among individual demand curves
produced growth of within group inequality throughout the period. This
widening among demand curves is independent of the rightward shifts of the
supply curves in the 70's which lowered the average skill gap ("rate of re-
turn"), and of upward shifts in the demand curves which raised the average
skill gap to new heights in the 1980's.
The course of inequality within groups dominated the changes in aggre-
gate inequality since the within group variance accounts for more than half
of the total variance.
2 The Human Capital Approach
Human capital theory views individual earnings Wi as the product of accu-
mulated investment in self Ki and the rates of return Ti on them. Both vary
across individuals. When the investments are measured in time units, such
as years of schooling and their equivalents6 in job training and other post-
school investments the products are logarithms of wages7. At working age
(experience) j , "capacity" (log) wages8 of individuals i are
]nwij = ai0 -\-riKij (1)
Here Kij is accumulated human capital through period j , with r^  the same
in all periods. A natural measure of wage inequality is the variance of lniUj.
The term c^ o represents log wages of individuals without accumulated hu-
man capital, which are very low in modern industrial economies, and will
be ignored for present purposes. With these assumptions the log variance in
equation 1 omitting a^ is
a
2{lnw) = f2a2(K) + a2{r)(K2 + (J2(K)) (2)
This expression derived by Goodman (1960) holds when r* and Ki are in-
dependent. In cross-sections of workers the relation between ri and Ki can
6The time-equivalent of investment Ki is the ratio of investment costs to the "capacity"
earnings in the relevant period.
7For derivation see Mincer (1974, p. 19).
8
"Capacity" earnings do not net out costs of investments in human capital.
be positive or negative. If the relation is positive the variance in (2) is
augmented by covariation of r^  and Ki. If negative the variance is corre-
spondingly reduced9. Assessing the signs and magnitude of the covariation
is helpful in the analysis that follows.
It is useful for our purposes to decompose the wage distribution into
sets defined by years of work experience. Aggregate wage inequality o\ is
a weighted sum of variances within each experience group (j) and of wage
differentials (dj) between experience groups10.
4 = E-(*M) (3)
3 = 1 UT
The weights ^-are given by the (working) age distribution, while the dj
reflect the slope of the (log) wage experience profiles. Putting these aside for
the moment, we focus on the major components a2 , the variances within
experience groups.
At any level of experience, Ki the accumulated human capital of indi-
vidual i measured in year equivalents consists of years of schooling Sj and
years of post-school investments Kpi, so Ki — s^ + KPi. The variance in the
experience set j is therefore:
a; = f2a2(Si + Kpi)j + az(r){a2{Sl + Kpi) + (s + Kpiy} + cov(rh K^ (4)
The last term on the right denotes the covariation between vi and K^.
A particular experience set j , at working age j — - termed the "over-
taking" set11 is of special interest. At that stage of experience, returns on
post-school investments are cancelled by costs. Therefore wages in the over-
taking set are capacity wages due to schooling alone, and the variance in (4)
contains only the schooling terms as shown in (5).
a
2
 = f2a2(s) + a2(r){s2. = f2a2(s) + a2(r){s2 + a2(s)} + cov(rh Si) (5)
9This covariation is not linear, but it moves with the linear covariance.
10dj is the difference between the mean log-wage in group j and the overall mean.
n For derivation see Mincer (1974, p.7).
3 Between and within schooling group in-
equality in the overtaking set
Because of the importance of human capital in schooling apart from training
or learning on the job, we first analyze the overtaking experience group to
explore the causes of differential movements between and within schooling
groups. For empirical purposes we defined the overtaking set in a broad 5-
year interval of 6 to 10 years of experience in order to accommodate changes
in r as well as to obtain a sufficiently large sample.
A regression equation of In w on schooling s in the overtaking set is
law = ao + rSi + ui (6)
In this regression, the explained variance f2a2(s) is a product of the variance
of schooling and the average rate of return (squared) on it, the first right hand
term in equation (5). The remainder is the within group residual a2(u). It
is portrayed in Fig 3.
Equation (5) shows that the within group or residual inequality o~2(u) does
not depend on the average size of the rate of return, but on its dispersion
a
2(r) as well as on the level and dispersion of schooling, s2 -\-a2(s). The term
<J2(s) is much smaller (less than 25) than the level s2. So despite appearing in
both between and within groups <J2(s) does not cause a correlation between
the within group and between group variances. Over time, as shown in Fig
3 the within group variance widened in the 70's while the between group
variance narrowed. Both widened in the 80's but not because of the common
term o~2(s), which remained rather stable throughout.
The meaning of these movements, divergent in the 70's and parallel in
the 80's, become clear in the framework of demand-supply analysis patterned
after Becker's distributional analysis (1967, 1975). In it individual marginal
rates of return on human capital are determined by the intersection of indi-
vidual demand Di and supply S{. For a given level of human capital IV s
differ according to their marginal productivity. The slopes of the ZVs are
negatively inclined because of diminishing returns to investments character-
izing individuals, whose overall potential is necessarily limited. For simplicity
the IVs are portrayed in Fig 4 as linear with the same slopes for each person.
The levels of supply curves differ across individuals as they face different costs
of investment. The linear supply curves are rising reflecting rising marginal
costs as the amount of borrowing increases12. Again the slopes are common
across individuals in Fig 4.
Educational attainment of young cohorts including those at the overtak-
ing stage of experience (6-10 years) increased rapidly in the 70's, as shown
in Fig 5. The increase in average schooling (s2) indicates a shift of the sup-
ply curves to the right as a result of which the average rate of return across
workers fell in the 1970's as was shown in Fig 1. Consequently the intergroup
variance f2a2(s) fell.
If the spread among demand curves cr2(D) and supply curves u2(S) had
not changed over time we would have found a decline in the intergroup vari-
ance f2a2(s) in the 70s and some increase in the intra-group residual variance
a
2(u) due to the increase in (s2), according to equation (5), where
a
2(u) = a2(r){s2 -f a2(s)} + cov(r, s) (7)
It turns out, however, that the growth of schooling s2 only partly accounts
for the growth of the residual variance o~2(u) in the 1970's. s2 increased by
less than 12 per cent while a2(u) increased over 30 per cent in the 1970's. In
the 1980's schooling level stabilized, but (J2{u) continued to grow though at
a slower rate.
What explains the continued growth of the within-group variance, <J2{u)
at overtaking?
After accounting for the growth of s2 -f a2(u) , &2(u) grew either because
(72(r) grew or the covariance term grew, or both, according to eq. 7.
The optimal distribution of schooling and of marginal rates of return, as
shown by the intersection of Di and Si in Fig 4, provides insights into changes
in <j2(r) and in cov(ri, Si).
Denote the intercepts of the demand curves in Fig 4 by di and of the sup-
ply curves by q. Assuming linearity and common slopes b and e respectively,
we have demand equations:
7-j = di- bsi (8)
and supply equations:
12 For elaboration see Becker (1967).
where r$ is the marginal rate of return and %i is the marginal interest cost,
is years of schooling. The scatter of intersections where r* = i* yields:
8i =
and
' (b + e)
Let ^- — 7 , then
f7Ci (12)
However, it is not the marginal r^  but the average rai that is multiplied
by Si to get In Wi, and this is the variable in equation (1) through (5). Since
rai — \{di-\- Ti) in our linear formulation,
<i = \{di + (1 - l)di + id} = (1 - |)di + \ci (13)
and
°
2(r'J = (1 - ifvHdi) + (|)V(Ci) (14)
We conclude from (14) that or2(r*i) increases if <J2(di) or a2(ci) or both
increase13. Now, the linear
7 7 b
cov(rlv si) = COV{{1 - -)di + - Q , (di - Ci)-} =
II 7
(15)
In eq. (15) the covariance grows when (J2(di) increases more than <T2(CJ),
or if <J2(ci) decreases while <J2{di) increases. Both <J2(di) and <J2(ci) cannot
decrease because that would decrease a2(u).
13The cov(dl,Ci) term is omitted from(14), on assumption that it remained stable over
time.
The evidence that cov(r^i} s*) increased (barely) in the 70's and strongly
in the 80's is provided by the coefficient of s2 in the wage function which
includes a quadratic term for schooling. If cov(r^ s*) ^ 0, a regression of r*ai
on Si is
A cov{rai,Si)
rai = al-\-a2si-\-vi) and a2 = 57-7 (16)
a
z(s)
The wage function is Inwi = OLQ + raiSi -\- Ui = CXQ + («i -f Q2si + ^js^ + u^
hence
In w^  = ao + aiSi + a2s2 + ViSi + u^  (17)
The sign of cov(r, s) shows up as the sign of a2 in the wage function. Annual
quadratic wage functions in the overtaking set show that a was negative
until the 1980's then increasingly positive. The graph in Fig 6 indicates that
cov(r, s) = Q>2<J2(S) grew little in the 70's but turned increasingly positive in
the 80's.
The change of sign in the coefficient of s2 of the wage function from nega-
tive in the 70's to positive in the 80's is interpretable in Becker's terminology
as a change in the wage distribution from the past dominance of inequality
of opportunity (spread of supply curves, <J2(di) > a"2(q) to a more recent
dominance of inequality of (cognitive) ability (<72(q) > o~2(dj). This propo-
sition is consistent with a great deal of recent research that emphasizes skill
or ability biased changes in the demand for human capital in the past quarter
century. In sum, while between (schooling) groups inequality declined in the
70's, the residual variance a2(u) grew in the 70's because s2 and cr2(r) in-
creased. In the 1980's the growth of cr2(u) came from the growth of cov(r, s)
and of o~2(r). Changes in both periods reflected increases in a2(di). In the
1980's the increases in average demand for human capital raised the average
rate of return f and increased inter-group inequality, while the widening of
micro-demand curves <J2(di) continued to increase the intra-group inequality
a
2(u).
The widening dispersion among micro demand curves a2(di) throughout
the period represents greater increases in demand for workers with the same
measured characteristics whose human capital is more productive, while de-
mand for less able or less skilled workers either increased less or actually
declined. The growth of the covariation (r ,^ s^ ) of rates of return with levels
of human capital is similarly interpretable as a growing human capital bias
in the demand for labor.
We now extend the analysis of wage inequality to the aggregate, which
according to equation (3) is a weighted sum of (log) wage variance in each
experience group j , and of intergroup differences in mean wages.
4 The Aggregate as a set of Experience Groups
The variance a2 at a fixed level of experience j can be written, rewriting
equation (4):
a) = {fV(s) + a2(r)[s2 + a2(s)} + cov(rh sj} + {f2a2{Kpi)j +
= <jf + a2{nKpi) (18)
A term omitted for the sake of simplicity is the cov(si, Kpi) which affects
a
2
 positively. The first right hand component of (18) is the variance at
"overtaking". The second component represents the contribution of post





 . Aggregate inequality o\ is, by eq. (3) and eq. (7):
= E - W + *2MW} + E - 4 =
According to equation (19), aggregate inequality is equal to the inequality
at overtaking, augmented by the contribution of post-school investment vari-
ances and of the steepness of experience wage proflles-both weighted by the
(working) age distribution.
We can calculate the contribution of each right hand term to the aggregate
variance, using measures of o\^ o2 and Y,j ^ aj a s follows:
(20)
Variances a'j at 8 experience levels were calculated year by year from CPS
data covering 40 years of work experience of the employed male work force.
The experience levels are in 5-year intervals. The experience profiles of the
8 variances a^ are shown in Table 1 in columns 1 to 8, for years 1970, 1980,
and 1990. With the exception of the initial experience level (col.l), the a^
increase with experience up to group 5 or 6, and decelerate thereafter, in all
periods.
As explained in (Mincer, 1974)the growth of these variances with expe-
rience reflects the cumulation of net post-school investments14. Deceleration
sets in when the investments terminate,in the third decade of experience.
Table 1 shows that the increase of inequality with experience is much
slower in 1980 than in 1970, while in 1990 it is twice as rapid as in 1970.The
difference in growth rate of these variances in 1970, 1980 and 1990 are at-
tributable to differences in investment volumes Kji at given j , and/or differ-
ences in Tj. The declines in r and Kj from 1970 to 1980, and their increase
in the 80's are plausible in view of observed changes in rates of return to
schooling, as rates of return to human capital are likely to move together
over time in schooling and in job training. The decline in r resulting from
the rapidly increasing supply of educated workers in the 1970's very likely
reduced the demand for job training15 But even if volumes of job training
were unaffected - no direct information is available - the decline in r is a suf-
ficient explanation of the differing rates of growth of variances in the decade
periods.
In inspecting the variances a? for j > 2 we see (in Table 1 and Fig 7, for
j = 5) that (cf — cr? ), the contribution of inequality in return to job training
a'jfriKpi) shows a U shaped pattern over time (1970 to 1990), with bottom in
1980. Reflecting these findings for each level of experience the contribution
of inequality in returns to post-school investments to aggregate inequality,
the second right hand term in (19) calculated by the second term in (20), is
also U-shaped. This is shown in Table 2 col.3.
Table 2 shows the aggregate variance (col.l) and its decomposition, by
14The simplest explanation (Mincer, 1974 p. 101) is by the process \nwj+i — \nwj+rkj,
j grows with j , and so does a2(\nwj) = <72(lnwj_i + rfcj_i), so long as kj > 0 and
r > 0, unless cov(In Wj, rkj) is strongly negative.
15For differing views on this matter, see Welch (1979), Berger (1985). See also Mincer
(1994), especially Table 10.
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eq.(12) and (13), with <r? = f2a2(s) + CT2(U)
III IV
Component
1 is the variance due to schooling wage differentials
II is the residual variance at overtaking, reflecting differentials within school-
ing groups
III is the variance component due to differences in returns to post-school
investments
IV is the contribution of between experience group wage differentials, which
reflect the steepness of the average wage profile.
The last component Ylj ^~$j l<& n°t U-shaped. It doubles from 1970 to
1980 and remains at the 1980 level in 1990. As was shown in the literature
(Welch 1979, Berger 1985,Mincer 1994), the wage profiles steepened in the
1970's because of the rapid growth of young cohorts ("baby boomers") in the
labor force.
If skill groups are defined by educational and post-school(e.g. job train-
ing) investments, the course of between group inequality is shown in Table
2 by components I-j-IIlH-IV representing the sums of variances of the school-
ing (I) and post-school components, (III) and (IV). Components I and III
declined in the 70's, and rose in the 80's, as did rates of return. Component
IV which reflects the slopes of wage profiles rose in the 70's and stabilized in
the 80's, largely as a result of demographic change. The within group vari-
ance (component II) grew in the 70's and in the 80's, for reasons analyzed in
section 3 above.
Since individual post-school investments (Kpi) are not observed, the ob-
served within group variance is the sum of components II and III. This
also grows monotonically over time, because a2(u) grows continuously, while
Y^j ^ -(J2{riKpi) is U-shaped but relatively small. The between group vari-
ance is now the sum of components I and IV and shows little change in the
70's, but growth in the 80's.
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The difference in behavior of the variance in group 1 and group 2, seen in
Table 1 and Fig 8 provides additional information: The difference is positive
and shows a continuous decline over calendar time. Since In wi = In w<2 — &i,
where ki are post-school investments at initial experience levels, and w^ are
wages at overtaking, that is capacity starting wages.
ai == °\ + °~2(^i) ~ 2cov(lnw2) ki) (22)
Small or negative covariances make for the excess G\ — o\ > 0. This difference
declined as the covariance in equation (22) grew over time16.
Here a continually rising covariance term would indicate that post school
investments rose more or declined less for workers with higher capacity wages
which reflect schooling or ability within schooling groups. This is consistent
with a growing skill bias in the demand for labor, the conclusion reached in
the closer examination of developments in the overtaking set in section 3.
5 Summary and Conclusions.
Aggregate inequality in wage rates of male workers increased since the 1970's
after decades of relative stability. At the same time measured skill differen-
tials in wages such as educational wage differentials narrowed in the 70's
and increased more strongly in the 80's. The discrepancy between changes
in aggregate and in "between group" inequality is explained mainly by the
growth since 1970 of "within group" or residual inequality which accounts
for more than half of aggregate inequality.
Why did residual (within group) inequality change over time differently
from the skill gap in wages? The question is answered in a human capital
approach. The formulation points to a distinction between movements of sets
of individual demand and supply curves for human capital and changes in
dispersions within the sets of IVs and SVs. The shifts in levels are responsible
for between group changes in wage inequality, while changes in dispersions
within the sets produce changes in within group inequality.
When groups are defined by education, the decline in the skill wage dif-
ferentials in the 70's is due to an increase in relative supplies of educated
16An alternative, not mutually exclusive possibility is a decline in a2(ki). It is less
plausible in view of the growth of training in the 1980's.
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workers with static average demand for human capital. The opposite is true
in the 80's. But while supply curves shifted in the 70's and demand curves
in the 80's, dispersion among the demand curves kept widening throughout
the period. This resulted in continued growth of residual inequality. The
widening dispersion across micro demand curves represents increasing skill
bias in the demand for human capital.
Empirical evidence was shown that residual inequality in the overtaking
set <J(U) grew since 1970, because all components of it grew. This implies a
widening dispersion in the demand curves, thus providing evidence for the
skill bias as the cause of increasing within group inequality.
By itself the widening inequality among demand curves o~(D) may not re-
flect a skill bias, if it were due merely to a random reshuffling of Di over time,
i.e. if cov{dijt_i) d^t) ~ 0. This is negated by the evidence on growing corre-
lation between levels of human capital and rates of return (e.g. the growth of
the cov{ri, Sj) and of the growing covariance between post-school investments
and levels of human capital, as inferred from the changing differences among
successive o~j in the 70's and 80's.
Prior to the 80's the variance in demand curves was smaller than the
variance in the supply curves. This was reversed in the 80's, as indicated by
the change of sign of the cov(r, s), while the variance in the set of demand
curves continued to grow. In Becker's terminology inequality of opportunity
dominated the inequality in ability prior to the 80's and the converse was
true thereafter. That the growing importance of cognitive (or information
and communication) skills underlie this transformation is attested by other
studies as well17.
When within group inequality is defined as the residual from the wage
function applying to the aggregate wage distribution, or to higher levels of
experience, an added component of the residual is due to the variance of post-
school investments across workers. Because of changes in the rate of return r,
this component a(riKpi) behaves like the between schooling group component
a(riSi), that is it has a similar u shaped pattern over time. However it is
a relatively small part of aggregate residual inequality which therefore does
not affect its persistent increases over time although it slows its pace in the
70's.
This analysis applies to the wage rates of males. Other studies have
17See in particular Murnane, Willet and Levy (1995).
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shown that patterns of change in total inequality were the same as described
here for the female and total labor force, as well as for annual and weekly
earnings as compared to wage rates. Levels and changes in inequality are
more pronounced in earnings as variance in hours adds to the variance in
wage rates even without a significant correlation between wages and hours.
Actually as the skill gap widened over time, hours of work fell for the less
skilled. The positive correlation in changes in hours and wage rates, itself
evidence of shifts in demand , raised the growth of inequality in earnings
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